47 pages • 1 hour read
Fareed ZakariaAge of Revolutions: Progress and Backlash from 1600 to the Present
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2024A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Part 2, Chapter 8-ConclusionChapter Summaries & Analyses
Part 2: “Revolutions Present”
Part 2, Chapter 8 Summary: “Revenge of the Tribes—Identity”
The year 1968 proved to be a turning point in American politics, for the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy stirred outrage among those agitating for social change. The protests held outside the Democratic Convention in Chicago that year were witnessed by the entire world. Other protests sprang up throughout Europe and Asia for a variety of different reasons. Ultimately, “1968 prefigured the two great trends that would reorder Western politics—the rise of identity politics and the growing polarization that accompanied it” (236).
Prior to this point in time, revolutions were sparked for economic reasons, but the new wave was different, for in America, the two pivotal issues driving protests were racial and gender equality. During the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement emerged to challenge the status quo. The related protests had the unexpected effect of driving blue-collar voters away from the left-leaning Democratic party. Voters’ traditional support of labor unions had been based on economic considerations. By 1968, these same voters were more concerned about the loss of racial privilege. In other words, their identity as high-status members of society was being threatened.
If the 1960s foregrounded civil rights, the 1970s emphasized gender equality and gay rights. Just as Southern segregationists were voting to maintain their cultural identity, the Christian Right perceived women’s rights and gay rights as threats to the traditional nuclear family. Again, cultural identity mattered more than the economic policies promoted by the Left or the Right. With Democratic politicians offering centrist economic solutions that appealed to conservative voters, the Republican party recognized the need to pick another battleground. Zakaria observes that “[t]o counter Clinton’s winning formula of centrist pragmatism, Republicans launched a new phase of the culture war. In 1996, Gingrich sponsored the Defense of Marriage Act” (261).
In addition to the Left’s threat to the traditional family, the Christian Right also coalesced around the question of religiosity. Church attendance was down across the board among liberals, so Republicans campaigned on a platform of upholding the morality of the country. Republican strategists had been using these issues to rally their base for decades before the emergence of Donald Trump, and Zakaria therefore concludes that “Trump was the culmination, not the cause, of the identity politics revolution that had swept through Western democracies” (264). Party platforms have since strayed far afield from economic considerations, and the emphasis is now upon maintaining loyalty to one’s chosen political “team,” regardless of real-time developments.
Part 2, Chapter 9 Summary: “The Dual Revolutions—Geopolitics”
Since the end of World War II, the world has experienced an unprecedented period of stability and economic growth that the author calls the “Pax Americana.” During this time, smaller nations have expanded their economies and now demand a greater role on the world stage. Previously, the United States enjoyed the role of hegemon, dominating the rest of the world, but recent shifts prove that the country must now adjust to a partnership model rather than being the sole decision-maker for other countries. Additionally, America finds itself faced with two nations that are neither partners nor allies. As Zakaria asserts, “the Pax Americana created conditions that produced the two biggest challenges to American hegemony: China’s rise as a peer competitor and Russia’s return as a spoiler” (274).
The author notes that the leaders of modern-day China aspire to something more than Chairman Mao’s vision of the destruction of capitalism. In the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping set a new course that included economic prosperity rather than revolution. Consequently, China’s economy has grown at a staggering rate. While it is still behind the United States, it is quickly closing the gap. However, the current president, Xi Jinping, is uncomfortable with his people’s growing interest in freedom, and he has enacted policies to strengthen state control for his own benefit. Zakaria states that Xi Jinping “saw that economic liberalization was transforming China profoundly—in a way that concerned him gravely” (296). Xi Jinping is trying to reverse this trend by emphasizing a return to traditional values that place the nation’s goals above any personal aspirations. Although China still perceives America as an ideological threat, just as America fears China’s growing economic power, Zakaria emphasizes the interdependence that both nations share in the new global economy.
Unlike China, however, Russia’s fortunes have taken a significant downturn, and Zakaria states that rather than being an economic threat to America, Russia is now a spoiler rather than a competitor. The author asserts that “[u]nder Vladimir Putin, Russia has become a resentful nation, convinced that during the Pax Americana it has been cheated of its empire and glory” (289). In an attempt to regain its lost power, Russia invaded Ukraine at a time in history when such medieval tactics are no longer tolerated by the global community. The author mentions the degree to which the world has abandoned realpolitik in favor of a global trade economy and stresses the need for new tactics to deal with these developing complexities, asserting that a mixture of “some deterrence, some intervention, [and] some coordination” will be necessary in order to prevent “the steady erosion of what order exists” (302).
Conclusion Summary: “The Infinite Abyss”
In the book’s conclusion, Zakaria points out the dilemma that revolutions create, paying particular attention to the constant pattern of “action and reaction, progress and backlash” (309). He notes that even though change and innovation improve the lives of the masses, they often come at the expense of stability and tradition. For some individuals, the price is too high. Personal autonomy requires the ability to create value within oneself rather than finding those values structured by an external source. This level of independence can be profoundly uncomfortable for some, and Zakaria explains that because of this resulting “void,” the trends of “populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism” (312) increase markedly and “offer people what the German-American scholar Erich Fromm called an ‘escape from freedom’” (312). Despite the backlash to innovation, the author asserts that people fundamentally desire freedom, even if transitions create temporary discomfort. He concludes, “In the end, as much as human beings are unsettled by the consequences of freedom for all, they still want it for themselves. They show this every day in all kinds of ways” (313).
Zakaria suggests softening the blow of progress by soliciting buy-in from the people who are most affected by innovation and change. The blue-collar workers and farmers of America gravitate toward populist politicians because they feel the greatest negative impact from the digital and economic revolutions, yet their needs are ignored by those pushing for more change. The example of the French Revolution shows that change mandated from above never works. Zakaria stresses the importance of not “work[ing] within the fabric of society, with actual communities and people, to educate, persuade, and convince them of your cause” (321-322) rather than enforcing change in a top-down fashion.
This approach requires time and patience, but the author notes that zealots grow impatient at the need to solicit cooperation from those they consider to be the unenlightened enemy. Both the Right and Left are equally guilty of this tendency, especially in the current polarized climate of American politics. However, Zakaria suggests that this very tug-of-war in democracies is the element that guarantees their survival in the long run. Age of Revolutions therefore concludes on an optimistic note, stating that despite the accelerating pace of change in the modern world, it is still possible to reconcile the needs of liberals with those of conservatives through the difficult but worthy act of compromise. The author ultimately asserts, “We are the heirs to the greatest tradition in history, one that liberated the human mind and spirit, that created the modern world, and whose greatest achievements are yet to come” (325).
Part 2, Chapter 8-Conclusion Analysis
The book’s final segment continues to emphasize The Paradigm Shift of Globalization, examining this phenomenon through the lenses of community identity and geopolitics. To this end, Zakaria observes that in earlier centuries, individuals defined their identities according to their nation, their religious affiliation, or the needs of their local community. However, many aspects of globalization owe their rise to the increasing influence of the internet, which simultaneously binds individuals together in cyberspace while isolating them from the world beyond their doors. Zakaria contends that until quite recently, people’s political values were shaped by economic considerations. However, the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and the feminist movement of the 1970s caused political affiliations to coalesce around issues of racism and sexism, and with the advent of these parallel developments, the world shifted into a paradigm in which “politics today is being transformed by identity” (236-237). Thus, in 1968, Southern segregationists who had once supported the economic policies of Democrats found themselves shifting to the conservative camp of Republicans. Likewise, the Christian Right did the same when the women’s liberation movement and the fight for gay rights threatened their concept of traditional family values. As Zakaria states, “If the ’60s was the era of white backlash to the civil rights movement, then the ’70s was a time of Christian backlash to women’s liberation and gay rights” (252).
The author also points out that ideology has supplanted economics as the driver of political affiliation. In making this argument, he shows a correlation between the rise of the internet and what can best be described as cultural tribalism. This trend is evidenced by the increasingly sharp divide between liberals and conservatives, for as the author observes, “[p]olitics is now about supporting your team and affirming your tribal identity, come what may” (265). As in previous chapters, Zakaria points out that Trump’s appeal to the Republican party did not coalesce in a vacuum. Instead, Trump’s arrival on the political stage coincided with a battle that had been brewing for decades between those who wanted to change society and those who wanted to turn back the clock entirely. Zakaria puts this idea in stark terms when he states:
Strong borders, law and order, and a war against ‘political correctness’—these were all popular with the Republican electorate. Trump was the culmination, not the cause, of the identity politics revolution that had swept through Western democracies. (264)
In the book’s two final chapters, Zakaria turns his attention away from the divisiveness of identity politics to consider the larger question of geopolitics and the ways in which nations are forced to work together despite their conflicting agendas. He chooses to consider the United States in relation to its greatest economic competitor, China, and in relation to its former superpower counterpart, Russia. Despite China’s growing power in the global marketplace, Zakaria points out that the Chinese threat of launching a war against America and its European allies is unlikely because all of these various factions, China included, are economically dependent on each other. Zakaria therefore predicts that “[m]ost likely, the world we are going to live in will lie uneasily between the two scenarios, with geopolitical tensions existing side by side with cooperation and economic ties” (277). Furthermore, he asserts that a global economy has created a more liberal attitude among the Chinese population: one that the country’s leaders are having a difficult time controlling.
Regarding America’s other great competitor, Russia, Zakaria again points out that new tactics are required for success in the globalized world. For this reason, Putin’s attempt to return to an aggressor model of realpolitik has been met by swift sanctions from the international community, along with the resounding condemnation that such barbaric tactics have no place in the modern world. Thus, “[t]o punish Russian aggression, Washington and its allies turned the very interdependence of the open trading system against Moscow” (290).
When evaluating the consequences of globalization, the author acknowledges that such a condition has never existed before. Consequently, dealing with global interdependence requires a new skill set to supersede the old conquest model of acquiring power and wealth. Zakaria defines advancement as the continuous tension between Cycles of Progress and Backlash, and he pragmatically accepts that those who want change will be opposed by those who do not. However, the hopeful tone of the early chapters returns in the book’s conclusion.
Taking a broad view of history, Zakaria asserts that the push-pull of liberals and conservatives has always resulted in positive change for humanity in the long run. To deal with the current unprecedented globalization phenomenon, he advises employing a combination of moderation and respect for the views of the opposing side, insisting that this approach will ensure the best possible outcome for everyone. As he states, “Don’t impose change from above. Instead, work within the fabric of society, with actual communities and people, to educate, persuade, and convince them of your cause” (321-22). Zakaria concludes with an encouraging message about the many benefits that globalization may bring, calling the current generation “the heirs to the greatest tradition in history, one that liberated the human mind and spirit, that created the modern world, and whose greatest achievements are yet to come” (325).
