The History of Sexuality: Volume 1

Michel Foucault summarizes what he calls “the repressive hypothesis.” Prior to the Victorian age, humans were less inhibited about sex. The Victorian regime implemented a puritanical prudishness that dominated every aspect of society. Sexuality became more hidden and secretive; it was an act delegated to married couples only. The Victorians demoted sex to an act of reproduction. Cultural norms reflected this shift, both in speech and dress. Foucault refers to this as a form of repression or “an injunction to silence” (4). However, the Victorians recognized that there were those portions of society that would not adhere to a more stringent approach to sexuality. These individuals were expected to utilize institutions that stood on the outskirts of polite society: the brothel and the mental hospital.

Foucault aligns the emergence of repression with the development of capitalism. Although psychoanalysis and Freud helped to dismantle some of the repressive efforts of the Victorian Age, the only way to destroy repression is through a radical shift in power. The bourgeois needed to limit sexuality to ensure a stronger focus on labor. Foucault argues that sex and power cannot be separated. When institutions of power limit access to sexuality, speaking about sex becomes an act of social and political rebellion. The repression of sex is also linked to religion. Repression and religion serve and reinforce one another.

Rather than focusing, however, on why society has become repressed, Foucault seeks to understand why society believes it is repressed and why that belief is partnered with feelings of guilt. The repressive hypothesis suggests that, since the Victorian Age, power and sex have become intrinsic, and the relationship between the two is manifested as repression. Proponents of the repressive hypothesis argue that the fact that so many people can pinpoint societal repression is evidence of its historical prevalence.

Foucault offers three doubts in response to the repressive hypothesis. These doubts are not intended to function as counterarguments. Instead, Foucault hopes that they will help refine his discussion about sexuality and power, returning the focus to a more objective historical analysis of how people talk and think about sex. First, he inquires whether sexual repression can be categorized as historical fact. Second, Foucault questions whether power is expressed through repression; he casts doubt on the idea that power limits rather than creates. Third, Foucault challenges the idea that criticisms of repression stand in opposition to repression itself. Instead of viewing repression and the critique of repression as separate points in history, one reacting to the other, Foucault suggests that it is possible that both are a part of the same system of power. The philosopher hopes to uncover more about the discourse surrounding sex—who talks about it, how they talk about it, and what conditions give rise to that discussion. While Foucault does not deny that limitations have been placed on sex and sexuality, he argues that focusing on repression alone restricts a greater understanding of the relationship between sex and power.