On Justice Power and Human Nature

“What particular people said in their speeches, either just before or during the war, was hard to recall exactly, whether they were speeches I heard myself or those that were reported to me at second hand. I have made each speaker say what I thought the situation demanded, keeping as near as possible to the general sense of what was actually meant.”

Thucydides’s meaning in what Woodward translates as “keeping as near as possible to the general sense” (51) is a source of spirited debate. Some scholars have proposed that Thucydides imaginatively reconstructed the speeches based on what he thought the speakers would have been compelled to say under the circumstances. Woodruff takes a different position: He proposes that Thucydides isn’t attempting to reproduce actual speeches that could have been recited at that moment but is using the occasion of speechmaking to reveal each speaker’s motives and beliefs.

“This history may not be the most delightful to hear, since there is no mythology in it. But those who want to look into the truth of what was done in the past—which, given the human condition, will recur in the future, either in the same fashion or nearly so—those readers will find this History valuable enough, as this was composed to be a lasting possession and not to be heard for a prize at the moment of a contest.”

Thucydides contrasting his “history” with others’ “mythology” has been understood, in modern terms, as a contrast between compositions that are “factual” versus “fictional.” However, such labels didn’t necessarily exist in Thucydides’s time. He anticipates current events repeating because “the human condition” (5) isn’t occasion-specific but unchanging and revealed eternally. Myths, on the other hand, could be occasion-specific when retold with unique twists “for a prize at the moment of a contest” (51) that took place at festivals. By recording events as they happened in the moment, Thucydides paradoxically captures the transcendent and eternal, unlike poets who change the myths to suit the moment.

“I believe that the truest reason for the quarrel, though least evident in what was said at the time, was the growth of Athenian power, which put fear into the Lacedaemonians and so compelled them into war, while the explanation both sides gave in public for breaking the Peace and starting the war are as follows.”

Though he goes on to enumerate specific events that increased hostilities, Thucydides announces early in his History the “true” cause of the Peloponnesian war: The Spartans’ fear of Athens’s growing power. Modern political theorists now call this the “Thucydides Trap,” meaning that the established power in a region will feel compelled to war when another power rises to challenge it. The dynamic that seems to interest Thucydides throughout his History is the one between fear and compulsion: Fear can make humans feel that they have no choice, even when they do have other choices.

“Really, Lacedaemonians, in view of our zeal and intelligent strategy during the Persian Wars, do we deserve to be treated with such extreme hostility by the Greeks, even though we do have an empire? After all, we did not take the empire by violence; it was the allies themselves who came and begged us to take command when you were unwilling to stay with us and finish off the war against the Persians. After that action we were compelled to develop our empire to its present strength by fear first of all, but also by ambition, and lastly for our own advantage.”

After the Spartan-Athenian alliance defeated the Persians in the Battle of Salamis in 480 BC, Sparta withdrew, leaving Athens to fill the power vacuum. In the above passage, delivered in response to Corinth’s accusations before the Spartan assembly, Athens’s argument is essentially that its empire arose organically, from necessity: Athens responded to requests for help from city-states at a time when Sparta had retreated from engaging with them. Athens’s growing power fueled a compulsion to continue growing, for various reasons. Repeatedly, Thucydides records how fear—and perceived needs—can mask motives and choices.

“The main reason the Lacedaemonians voted that the treaty had been broken and that the war should begin was not that the allies’ speeches had persuaded them. They made this decision because they were afraid Athenian power would continue to grow, seeing that most of Greece was already subject to them.”

Not for the first time, a powerful state decides out of expediency what’s in their best interests—not necessarily what is just according to traditional values and laws. Woodruff notes that this passage exemplifies how Thucydides may have been more concerned with illuminating motives than with making moral judgments. To this end, he doesn’t specify whether Athens indeed could be said to have broken the treaty, only that Sparta was more motivated by fear that Athens was becoming more powerful.

“[Y]ou must realize that although we are being forced into this war, if we embrace it willingly, we will have less pressure from the enemy. Remember too that the greatest danger gives rise to the greatest honor for a city or a private man. Our ancestors, after all, stood up to the Persians; they started with less than we have now, and even gave up what they had. It was more good planning than good luck, and more daring than power, that enabled them to repel the Persian king and raise our city to its present heights. We must measure unto our ancestors.”

The above passage is a section from Pericles’s war speech, delivered before the Spartans’ declaration of war, as Athens was debating how to proceed. Pericles claims that Athens is being “forced” into the war, not because Sparta has attacked them but because Sparta has made demands to which Athens doesn’t want to capitulate. They fear the consequences of being perceived as weak and not living up to their ancestors’ achievements. Pericles wishes to believe that strategy and daring, rather than chance and power, led to Athens’s victory against the Persians, perhaps because these are Athens’s strengths relative to Sparta’s. Nevertheless, throughout his History, Thucydides shows how outcomes are often dictated by chance events—such as a storm extinguishing a fire, a collapsing fortification being mistaken for an attack, or (as happened to Thucydides) a force arriving too late to affect events.

“When the power of the city seems great to you, consider then that this was purchased by valiant men who knew their duty and kept their honor in battle, by men who were resolved to contribute the most noble gift to their city: even if they should fail in their attempt, at least they would leave their fine character [arete] to the city. For in giving their lives for the common good, each man won praise for himself that will never grow old; and the monument that awaits them is the most splendid—not where they are buried, but where their glory is laid up to be remembered forever, whenever the time comes for speech or action. For to famous men, all the earth is a monument, and their virtues are attested not only by inscriptions on stone at home; but an unwritten record of the mind lives on for each of them, even in foreign lands, better than any gravestone.”

This passage is an excerpt from Pericles’s Funeral Oration in honor of the first war casualties. The reference to “fine character” may be Pericles/Thucydides making a comparison between mythic heroes and present-day Athenian soldiers. The most general meaning of the Greek word arete is “excellence,” a quality for which mythic heroes strive. In addition, the “inscriptions on stone” may refer to a Spartan practice of inscribing names on grave monuments only of men who died in battle (and women who died in childbirth). In contrast, Pericles/Thucydides may be saying that Athenians’s excellence is known near and far, and this, rather than grave markers, is the most enduring monument.

“No one was held back in awe, either by fear of the gods or by the laws of men: not by the gods, because men concluded it was all the same whether they worshipped or not, seeing that they all perished alike; and not by the laws, because no one expected to live till he was tried and punished for his crimes.”

Here, Thucydides describes the social collapse that occurs during the plague. Neither of the two critical sources of Greek civilization—reverence for the gods and the laws of each city—are honored. Memories of the glorious deeds of men, which Pericles assures Athenians will be their everlasting monument, are forgotten in the chaos and terror of plague.

“What heaven sends we must bear with a sense of necessity, what the enemy does to us we must bear with courage—for that is the custom in our city; that is how it used to be, and that custom should not end with you.”

In his last speech, Pericles attempts to comfort the Athenians, who blame his strategies (allowing Sparta to raid the countryside and bring all the citizens inside the city walls) for their troubles. His appeal to necessity is limited to what gods and enemies compel, without addressing the role of his own choices as leader. Woodruff’s suggestion that Thucydides uses speeches to reveal the speaker’s motives and beliefs raises the possibility that Pericles potentially deludes himself about the impact of his decisions as leader.

“Athens was in name a democracy [ii.37], but in fact was a government by its first man. But because those who came after were more equal among themselves, with everyone aiming to be the chief, they gave up taking care of the commonwealth in order to please the people.”

Thucydides has been called difficult to translate and thus to interpret, as this passage demonstrates. After presenting Pericles’s speech praising Athens, Thucydides shows how Pericles’s policies resulted in a plague devastating the city and taking the life of Pericles himself. Nevertheless, Thucydides’s final judgment on him seems laudatory, in contrast with Athens’s subsequent leaders who failed to put the welfare of the whole city first and instead jockeyed for importance and influence by catering to public opinion. Some scholars have suggested that this passage expresses Thucydides’s preferred form of government: a hybrid that incorporates democracy but also has a strong leader at the helm. Woodruff suggests an alternative possibility that Thucydides’s intentions are ambiguous, opening debate but not attempting to resolve it.

“King Archidamus first called on the gods and heroes of the land as his witnesses: ‘All you gods and heroes who protect Plataea, be my witnesses that, because they first broke the oath we swore together, there has been no injustice at all in our entering their land, where our ancestors defeated the Persians after praying to you, and where you made the ground favorable for the Greeks in the contest. And there will be no injustice in what we are about to do now, because, although we have made many reasonable offers, we have had no luck with them. Consent, then, to our punishing those who started the injustice, and agree to their paying the price to those who exact it in accordance with law.’”

In this passage, Sparta’s King Archidamus prays to the “gods and heroes who protect Plataea” to approve his attack. Applying Woodruff’s suggestion that speeches reveal the speaker’s motives, Archidamus attempts to justify attacking a former ally by claiming that they’ve broken an oath, which compels him and his Spartans to punish them. As with Athens and Melos later in the text, the conflict between Sparta and Plataea isn’t one between equals but one in which a stronger party justifies its exercise of power by calling it justice.

“Long ago we should have given Mytileneans no more privileges than our other allies, and then they would not have come to this degree of insolence, for generally it is human nature to look with contempt on those who serve your interests, and to admire those who never give in to you.”

Here, Cleon argues for the destruction of Mytilene by claiming that human nature respects power but not benevolence. His appeal to human nature isn’t supported by a specific instance that demonstrates his point. What he calls respect might more properly be called fear. City-states like Plataea, Mytilene, and Melos, which remain loyal to their allies and ideals, can suffer for doing so, just as powerful city-states can be destroyed by their own ambitions, as Athens is. As during the plague, being just or unjust doesn’t necessarily equate to whether one is rewarded.

“Therefore I contend then and now that you ought not to alter your former decision, and you ought not to make the mistake of giving in to the three things that are most damaging to an empire: pity, delight in speeches, and a sense of fairness.”

In this passage from the same speech, Cleon argues that empires can’t afford to have pity, speeches (effectively meaning debate), and fairness. Having become an empire, Athens is now compelled to safeguard that empire or risk facing rebellions that could put the city itself at risk. Cleon’s speech reflects Thucydides’s preoccupation with compulsion, the idea that events can trigger a feeling that only one choice exists.

“Our dispute, if we are sensible, will concern not their injustice to us, but our judgment as to what is best for us. Even if I proved them guilty of terrible injustice, I still would not advise the death penalty for this, unless that was to our advantage. Even if they deserved to be pardoned, I would not have you pardon them if it did not turn out to be good for the city.”

In his rebuttal to Cleon regarding how to respond to the revolt in Mytilene, Diodotus doesn’t challenge the idea that Athens must do what’s in its best interests regardless of whether it’s just. However, his argument is the opposite of Cleon’s: Diodotus believes that being excessively harsh will create a sense of desperation, which can be unpredictable. If Athens’s allies believe that they’ll be punished whether they act against the city or not, this, according to Diodotus, will incentivize them to revolt, since they’ll have nothing to lose but everything to gain.

“In peace and prosperity, cities and private individuals alike are better minded because they are not plunged into the necessity of doing anything against their will; but war is a violent teacher: it gives most people impulses that are as bad as their situation when it takes away the easy supply of what they need for daily life.”

Here, Thucydides reflects on the consequences of war—particularly civil war. Fear—of violence, famine, loss of control/power, etc.—can make people feel that they don’t have choices. Thucydides seems to suggest that it’s not lack of choices but lack of desirable choices that provokes people to justify their bad acts, which leads to social erosion and, eventually, collapse.

“Now that life had been thrown into confusion in the city, human nature—which is accustomed to violate justice and the laws—came to dominate law altogether and showed itself with delight to be the slave of anger, the master of justice, and the enemy of anyone superior.”

Continuing his reflections on civil war, Thucydides in this passage seems to hold a negative view of human nature. Woodruff cautions readers to compare commentary of this sort with Thucydides’s commentary elsewhere in the book. Human nature can acquit itself honorably in some circumstances and poorly in others. It declines as circumstances decline, hence the importance of maintaining stability.

“Even so, I will not believe I am doing an injustice, since I have two utterly compelling reasons for this: first, so that the Lacedaemonians will not be harmed by the taxes you will pay to Athens if, for all your goodwill, you do not join us; second, so that the other Greeks will not be prevented by you from escaping their subjugation.”

Here, Brasidas justifies his decision to retaliate against Acanthus if they don’t revolt from Athens. Assuming, as Woodruff proposes, that the speech reflects what Thucydides believes Brasidas’s motives to be, the speech may be demonstrating the ways in which stronger powers rationalize their choices, making them seem like necessities. Thucydides himself doesn’t evaluate whether Brasidas’s reasoning is fair and just but leaves this for readers to debate and decide.

“[W]e both know that decisions about justice are made in human discussions only when both sides are under equal compulsion; but when one side is stronger, it gets as much as it can, and the weak must accept it.”

The above passage is one of the more famous and hotly debated passages from Thucydides’s History. It has been interpreted to mean, essentially, “might makes right” (215). Woodruff believes otherwise: In his view, the Athenians aren’t making appeals to justice but observing that the stronger power is able to set terms over the weaker power. The Athenians go on to refer to their discussion with Melos as “a conference about your survival and not about resisting those who are far stronger than you” (137). The choice facing Melos is whether to capitulate to Athens or to be destroyed by Athens.

“Do not be distracted by a sense of honor; this destroys people all too often, when dishonor and death stand before their eyes. Many have been so overcome by the power of this seductive word, ‘honor,’ that even when they foresee the dangers to which it carries them, they are drawn by a mere word into an action that is an irreparable disaster; and so, intentionally, they fall into a dishonor that is more shameful than mere misfortune, since it is due to their own foolishness.”

In this passage, Athens cautions Melos not to be compelled into disaster by pursuing an abstract sense of honor. Honor as a “seductive word” is contrasted with tangible, “irreparable disaster” (140). For an historical audience, the dialogue between Athens and Melos might seem ironic, given Athens’s own pursuit of honor via the conquest of Sicily, which lured them into catastrophic disaster.

“I know that all of those people who are as brilliantly successful as I am will cause pangs of envy as long as they live (especially to their peers, but also to everyone they meet); after their deaths, however, they will leave a legacy of people who claim a kinship with them that never existed, and a country that boasts of them not as strangers or sinners, but as their very own citizens who have done fine things.”

Here, speaking in support of launching the Sicilian expedition, Alcibiades is responding to negative criticism of his character from Nicias and, presumably, others. Alcibiades seems to be comparing himself to mythic heroes who achieve great things but are the objects of undue attention, criticism, and punishment for various reasons, whether from gods or mortals. Alcibiades compares his afterlife to that of heroes, who leave a legacy not only admirable in an abstract sense but also in the sense of their becoming the objects of cult worship.

“But the difficulty of equipping the expedition did not wipe out their desire to make it; instead, it inflamed them all the more, and the result was the opposite of what he expected: they approved of his advice and thought there would be no danger now at all. Now everyone alike fell in love with the enterprise.”

Thucydides repeatedly returns to unpredictability—not only of unanticipated natural events that ruin the best-laid plans but also of human intentions. Nicias uses several tactics to discourage the Athenians from launching the expedition, but no matter what approach he uses, his efforts are futile. Even his caution that the expedition would be prohibitively costly doesn’t discourage the Athenians; instead, it mobilizes them to sink more money and men into the expedition. Later, this decision proves disastrous, as all the soldiers, ships, and gear are lost.

“I do love my city, but as a place where I could safely engage in public life, not as the site of injustice to me. I do not think the city I am going against is my own; it is much more a matter of my recovering a city that is not mine. A true lover of his city is not the man who refuses to invade the city he has lost through injustice, but the man who desires so much to be in it that he will attempt to recover it by any means he can.”

Alcibiades decided to defect to Sparta after Athens accused him of crimes against religion. In this passage from Alcibiades’s speech to the Spartans, explaining his motivations, Thucydides presents him not necessarily or only as a man who is offended by a personal grievance but also who believes that his city is acting against its own best interests. Thus, Alcibiades doesn’t consider himself to be betraying his city because the city has already betrayed itself via its betrayal of Alcibiades. By helping Sparta defeat this “unjust” Athens, Alcibiades convinces himself that he’s helping restore Athens to itself.

“Indeed, the Syracusans were no longer concerned merely to save themselves, but were designing ways to block the escape of the Athenians, since they correctly believed that their strength was now much greater than the Athenians’ and that if they could overcome the Athenians and their allies both at sea and on land, they would win great glory among the Greeks. Of the other Greeks, they hoped, some would be set free immediately, while others would be liberated from fear, since it would be impossible for Athens, with her remaining strength, to sustain any longer the war that would be brought down upon her. And they would be given credit for this, so that everyone else—even generations to come—would admire them greatly.”

In this passage, Thucydides shows the cyclicality of human dynamics. The Athenian empire felt compelled to expand her empire to protect it, but nothing went as expected and intended. Now, the Syracusans are the stronger party, and they too feel compelled to vaunt their power and become a legend that future generations will remember. The latter is a cultural value that carries over from Homer and the heroic age and finds expression in contemporary events.