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Guy DebordA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
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In this chapter, Debord takes up the topic of the relationship between theory and praxis, or the relationship that allows for knowledge to be translated into actions that substantially transform the world. In addition, Debord undertakes an analysis of the relationship between thought and action against the backdrop of the historical debates between socialists, communists, and anarchists in the 1860s and 1870s.
For Debord, the first key moment that establishes the possibility of fusing thought and action such that social revolution would be the product of this synthesis is Marx’s critique of Hegel. As Debord notes, while Marx’s analysis of capitalism remains forever indebted to Hegel’s dialectical method, Hegel fell short of translating thought into action precisely because, for him, theory was grounded upon the principles of logic and reason and not founded upon historical and material conditions.
Marx, by contrast, began from the idea that theory always finds itself grounded within a historical context and thus to translate thought into revolutionary action, one must first understand the historical conditions that oppress and hinder collective freedom. However, according to Debord, Marx himself fell short of the aim of fusing thought and action in order to give rise to a revolutionary practice precisely because Marx’s analysis of Capital still gave priority to the faithful theoretical understanding of the structure of capitalist society over and against the genesis of a theory of capitalism that emerged from workers struggles themselves. And yet, Debord is quick to point out that Marx himself already had a sense for this limitation of his own thinking: “Marx clearly exposed the limits of his own science” (Section 89). For Debord, it is this tension between theory and action that remains the horizon of contemporary struggles.
In this chapter, Debord develops an analysis of the temporal nature of political power as it has progressed through the ages. As Debord points out, early dynastic forms in China or in Egypt were able to assume political power by holding a monopoly over the constitutive myths that form their respective cultures and social lives: “in China and Egypt they long held a monopoly over the immortality of the soul; their first known dynasties are an imaginary arrangement of the past” (Section 132). What distinguishes modern capitalist forms of power from its predecessors is that political power is maintained by the capitalist class to the extent that they hold a monopoly on how people are allowed to use the time allotted to them in their individual lives: “the class which organizes this social labor and appropriates the limited surplus value [capitalist class], at the same time appropriates the temporal surplus value of its organization of social time: it possesses for itself alone the irreversible time of the living” (Section 128). So, while in previous historical societies power was dictated by those who held a monopoly on social and cultural norms, power today is exercised by those who have the greatest influence on the socioeconomic basis of daily life (i.e. the capitalist class).
In this chapter, Debord develops the argument that the fundamental nature of the form alienation takes under the society of the spectacle is temporal. This is because life under capitalism is organized and structured according to the time required for commodity production (commodity-time). Thus, says Debord, people’s ability to develop their skills and capacities are forever hindered by the fact that they are economically compelled to devote their time and energy to the production of commodities, rather than to their personal talents: “The condition required for reducing workers to the status of “free” producers and consumers of commodity time was the violent expropriation of their time” (Section 159).
In place of the time required for the personal development of individual talents, says Debord, exists what he calls consumable-time—the time for vacations, cultural events, and leisure, all of which are only time enough for the recuperation of the energy required to once again return to the rhythm of the working day and the production cycle. Hence, even in moments of leisure and rest, human development and personal growth are found lacking:
The social image of the consumption of time, in turn, is exclusively dominated by moments of leisure and vacation, moments represented at a distance and desirable by postulate, as are all spectacular commodities. This commodity is here explicitly given as the moment of real life whose cyclical return is awaited. That which was represented as genuine life is exposed as simply more genuinely spectacular life (Section 153).
In Chapters 4-6, Debord engages with the various methodologies of analyzing capitalist society, and how the kinds of knowledge we produce have a direct impact upon the efficacy of revolutionary action. For Debord, there is a necessary relationship between the way in which we come to know the world and the degree to which it becomes possible for us to transform society.
By beginning with the shortcomings of Marx—the shortcoming being that Marx, for most of his career, remained convinced that capitalism would abolish itself on its own accord due to the internal contradiction between the needs of workers and the needs of the market—Debord highlights Marx’s own self-criticism: if what is desire is the transformation of an unequal and alienating society (capitalism) into an egalitarian and liberated one (communism), then what is needed is a kind of knowledge of capitalist society that not only informs workers, but renders them able to understand how to change their current material condition.
In Chapters 5 and 6, Debord considers the kind of knowledge that is produced regarding capitalist society from the vantage point of those who benefit from capitalism, or from the perspective of those who exclude history from their analyses. For Debord, the kinds of knowledge produced by these two groups not only contribute to a collective forgetting of the history of struggles for equality that have made capitalism what it currently is, these kinds of knowledge do the additional harm of justifying the society of the spectacle and defend a society that announces itself to be free and equal in theory while being alienating and divided in reality.
It is in this sense that Debord concludes Chapter 6 with the claim that what is said to be the representation of “genuine” life (i.e. the knowledge of capitalism produced by those who benefit or are ignorant of the class struggle that is the essence of capitalist production) is nothing but the inversion of life, or what Debord calls authentically “spectacular life.”