What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets

Sandel continues to employ examples to illustrate The Immorality of Over-Commodification, including paying for line-standers to enter congress. Sandel aligns himself with the views of The Washington Post, which labels this practice “demeaning” to Congress and “contemptuous of the public” (26). Sandel emphasizes the problematic nature of this practice when he refers to the exclusion of the environmentalists by another group of lobbyists at a hearing. He implies that, in a democracy, one shouldn’t be able to pay to reserve the entirety of the Congress floor, which is essentially what can occur with the line-standers. He continues to suggest that there are some things that money should not be able to buy, and that this practice “degrades Congress by treating it as a source of private gain rather than an instrument of the public good” (42, emphasis added).

Sandel refers to, and then ridicules, the idea that the market regulates itself by allocating goods to those who want them most (the argument used to justify the morality of free markets): “[O]f course, it might be argued that if the environmentalists cared enough about attending the hearing, they too could have queued up overnight. Or they could have hired homeless people to do it for them” (28). Sandel’s tongue-in-cheek tone satirizes and mocks the idea that paying line-standers to reserve the floor of Congress is a moral and righteous practice, and that the market is inherently righteous in terms of its distribution of goods to those who want them most.

The justification of the practice by the owner of the line-standing company, Mike Gross, further illustrates Sandel’s criticism of the fact that “anything goes” in an unregulated society that prioritizes market values above moral righteousness: “Linestanding may seem like a strange practice, but it’s ultimately an honest job in a free-market economy” (26). Sandel is unconvinced by Gross’s justification, objecting to the commodification of political participation and activism.

Sandel further positions over-commodification as immoral in his exploration of amusement parks offering a higher ticket price to jump the line. He points out that the designers of the scheme subtly acknowledge an inherent discomfort at the idea of blatantly paying to overtake others: “[T]his need for discretion suggests that paid line cutting—even in an amusement park—tugs against a nagging sense that fairness means waiting your turn” (22). Sandel suggests that humans innately feel that line jumping, created in an increasingly commodified society, is inherently wrong.

Similarly, Sandel quotes Greg Mankiw, an economic theorist, who justifies the inherent righteousness imposed by free-market practices, such as ticket scalping: “By charging the highest price the market will bear, scalpers help ensure that consumers with the greatest willingness to pay for the tickets actually do get them” (35). However, Sandel invokes the links between Free-Market Values and Social Inequality to undermine Mankiw’s justification of free markets, pointing out that people have unequal access to financial means: “[T]he willingness to pay for a good does not show who values it most highly. This is because market prices reflect the ability as well as the willingness to pay” (37, emphasis added).

Sandel thus argues that those at the front rows of sporting events, musical performances, or plays may be more of a reflection of who can afford to pay the most, rather than who inherently loves the performance or spectacle the most. This is also the case for Shakespeare in the Park, with over-commodification violating the principle of fairness that underpins the endeavor: “[T]he mission of the Public Theater, a publicly subsidized, nonprofit enterprise, is to make great theater accessible to a broad audience drawn from all walks of life” (25).

Sandel also views the emergence of Concierge Medicine in America as an identical process of line jumping. MD², a company that offers exclusive Concierge Medicine, gives a sleek justification of its exclusivity: “[T]he availability and level of service we provide absolutely necessitates that we limit our practice to a select few” (31). Sandel suggests that this exclusivity means that “the culling of the queue has already taken place, out of view, by the imposition of the fee” (33). He argues that, despite the subtlety and the carefully constructed advertising language offered by Concierge Medicine practices, this practice is just as problematic and morally unscrupulous, since pay-for-use services automatically relegate less-wealthy patients to less-adequate healthcare: “[C]oncierge care for a few depends on shunting everyone else onto the crowded rolls of other doctors” (33). Sandel implies that this exclusion may have real consequences for the health of less-wealthy individuals.

The examples explored by Sandel in these chapters illustrate “the growing reach of money and markets into spheres of life once governed by nonmarket norms” (33). Sandel continues to urge readers to problematize the proliferation of market norms and market thinking, thereby referring to one of the pivotal themes underlying his work: The Importance of Debate on Market Values.